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Abstract
This paper discusses a cross-national pilot study in Sweden and the UK, examining young
people’s environmental concerns and their perceptions of the causes and solutions. The study
demonstrates that evaluations of the causes of environmental degradation are partly contingent
upon the manner in which questions are framed leading to quite different interpretations of the
findings. Moreover, attitudes also differ significantly between the British and the Swedish sample:
in the UK environmental degradation is seen as more serious but also more far away from the
respondents’ everyday experiences when answering pre-formulated questions. The causes of
environmental degradation are located in both countries in government and industry policies
promoting economic growth on the one hand. On the other they identify distant developments in
emerging economies as problems, without connecting their local experiences to the global effects
they describe. In the open-ended part of the survey, individual behaviour is seen as the most
important cause of environmental degradation. But while British respondents describe individuals
as selfish, lazy and consumerist, Swedish respondents emphasise also structural causes like
Western lifestyles and the market society. We present possible explanations for these differences
and discuss the relationships between the global and the local in relation to constructions of the
Other as well as the relationship of individualism and authoritarianism that emerge from the
results.
1. Setting a Context for Concern about Environmental Degradation and Climate Change
"These things only happen in India, they don’t happen in Sweden".  So commented a Swedish
member of the public less than 24 hours after the sinking of the Estonia in the Baltic on 28th
September 1994 with the loss of over 852 lives. In one sense, their perception was symptomatic of
how the majority of the population in the global North thinks about the loss of life and suffering in
environmental tragedies and disasters; they appear to happen at a greater magnitude and frequency
a long way from the global North. In another sense this comment may also reflect a way of
thinking about the global South as less developed, less well organised and therefore more of a
threat to the environment than the “better” organised global North. This construction of the global
South as the threatening ‘Other’ (Said, 1978, Hall, 1997) is generally not discussed in the
literature on environmental degradation, climate change[2] and the local/global relationship. As
we will demonstrate in this paper, there is a need to include this perspective, since it forms part of
the way in which individuals perceive environmental degradation and climate change.
The opposition of the local and global has long been a discriminator for thinking about the causes
and consequences of environmentally damaging actions and the level at which individuals and
groups might act to reduce their impacts. Research to date on the local/global dimension to public
understanding and concern about climate change, while focussing on differential evaluations, has
only rarely discussed the findings in a theoretical context, at least from a psychological point of
view. Much of the research literature on public attitudes and behaviours in respect of climate
change focuses on the value-action gap such that while there seems to be widespread public
concern about climate change, such concern is not translated into carbon-reducing actions
(Gardner and Stern, 2002). This is often interpreted by environmental experts and policy-makers
through an information-deficit model with the conclusion that the public require more
information, clearer information and simpler information (Bulkeley 2000, Bonnes, Uzzell et
al 2007). But divergences between expert, policy makers and public understandings of climate
change should not been seen as the consequence of an information-deficit by the public, but rather
a different perspective, with lay-expert discrepancies not as great as they are often portrayed
(Bonnes, Uzzell et al, 2007; Gifford, Scannell, et al 2009). Far from lacking information,
understanding and sophistication, the public’s representation in some respects may be
more sophisticated precisely because it is “.... tied to larger questions of the relations between
society and nature” (Bulkeley, 2000, 314).
In part stemming from an information-deficit model approach, the received wisdom in psychology
and the social sciences would be that most individuals are neither interested nor capable of
understanding environmental problems at a global abstract conceptual level (De Haven Smith
1988), as they are primarily concerned about issues and exposure to risk which are immediate,
local and reflect personal interests, experiences and group membership (Catton and Dunlap ,1978,
Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1978, Vining and Ebro, 1990, Zube, 1991). Such bias is
reinforced by four forces which may have served, intentionally or unintentionally, to focus the
public’s attention on the seriousness of global as opposed to local or even national environmental
problems. The globalisation of institutions with new forms of technology, management and media
oiled by the fluid movement of finance around the globe in seconds has had a huge impact on the
everyday lives of people – catastrophic for many since September 2008.  In addition, local
agendas have become increasingly informed, if not determined by global perspectives, policies
and decision-making (Bauman, 1998). To these phenomena can be added the critical role the mass
media play in structuring and defining reality, the expanding membership of international
organisations (e.g. Greenpeace), and major scientific and political conferences (Rio 1992, Kyoto
1997, Johannesburg 1998, Copenhagen 2009) as well as high profile public outputs of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007).
During the last decade there has been a noticeable increase in public awareness concerning
climate change in particular and environmental degradation in general. While the likes of the
IPCC, Friends of the Earth and national governments remind us daily of the perils of continued
carbon emissions, it has been noticeable that the public themselves are now employing the
discourse of climate change and drawing on their own experience to justify and exemplify their
concerns and confirmation that the climate is changing. Whether it is a greater frequency and
severity of local flooding and storms, or simply the earlier appearance of spring flowers, people’s
daily experience reinforces in their own eyes the realisation that the climate is changing. Now and
again, the experiential tectonic plates of the global South grate against those of the global North
(e.g., Hurricane Katrina) and there is a momentary appreciation of the ‘paramount reality’ (Berger
and Luckmann, 1967) of those for whom environmental disasters are a more common occurrence.
Given the range of issues which are fuelling a public discourse about climate change and its effect
on place, it is little surprising then that all the evidence from public opinion polls shows an
increase in public concern about climate change (Defra, 2007, Department of Transport 2008).
Approximately 80% of adults in the UK said that they were very or fairly concerned about climate
change, with a quarter being very concerned. However, there were some groups who were less
concerned and had relatively low levels of knowledge, e.g., young people aged between 16 and
24. About 10% of adults said that they knew a lot about climate change and a further 40% said
they knew a fair amount. This implies that half the population do not know much about climate
change. These findings serve not just to support but more importantly lock one into an
information-deficit model to explain and guide climate change action.
Recent research by Leiserowitz, Maibach and Roser-Renouf (2008) has sought to segment the
United States population into six climate change audiences ranging from the Alarmed (19% of the
population), through the Concerned (22%), Cautious (20%), Unconcerned (12%), Doubtful
(16%), to the Dismissive (11%). As might be expected, the alarmed, concerned and cautious were
much more exercised about the threat climate change presents to people in other countries than the
unconcerned, doubtful and dismissive. But all groups from the alarmed to the dismissive thought
that the threat of climate change was going to be much greater for those in other countries than in
their local community. It was noteworthy that the more concerned the segment, the less the
difference between the local and the global with the exception of the dismissive whose level of
concern was so low that it made little difference. Given that the report was published out of the
Centre for Climate Change Communication it is not surprising that the authors interpret the results
largely in terms of the need for enhanced communication, whether for motivation or in terms of
providing examples of what people can do to become part of the solution. They do, however,
suggest that “most importantly, they need to understand how critical it is for them to act as
citizens – by engaging with elected officials on the issue – in addition to wielding their influence
as consumers.” (Leiserowitz, Maibach et al, 2008: 20).
There has been comparatively little research on the differential perceptions of local/global
environmental problems (Dunlap et al, 1993, Jianguang, 1994, Gooch, 1995), although there is
every suggestion that such a distinction could be crucially important in terms of understanding the
public’s perception and attitudes towards environmental problems as well as their subsequent
behaviour. Dunlap et al (1993) found that when respondents in twelve industrialised countries
were asked ‘…..to rate the quality of the environment a) in your local community, b) in our
nation, and c) of the world as a whole’, 20.5% of respondents rated the quality of their local
environment as ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’, compared with 30.9% who rated the quality of the national
environment as ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’, and 79.3% who rated the quality of the global environment as
‘bad’ or ‘very bad’. In the same study, the authors found that respondents from ‘developing’
countries were far more concerned about local environmental problems than respondents from the
industrialised nations.
Throughout the 1990s a series of research studies were undertaken to look at spatial biasing in
respect of concern about the relative local/global impact of environmental problems (Uzzell,
2000). Respondents in the UK, Australia, Slovakia, as well as samples of children, environmental
‘experts’, and members of the public were each asked about the seriousness of seven
environmental problems (i.e., water pollution, atmospheric pollution, the effects of acid rain,
global warming, noise pollution, deforestation and holes in the ozone layer) in terms of their
potential impact on the individual, their local area, the country, their continent and the world.
Respondents were asked to rate the degree of seriousness on a five-point rating scale varying from
1 (extremely serious) to 5 (not at all serious) for each of the areal levels.  They were also asked to
declare their feelings and attributions of responsibility for action in respect of these issues at each
areal level.
***** Figure 1 Here *****
The ‘headline’ finding from the study was that environmental degradation was perceived as more
serious at a global level than their effects at the continental, country, town or individual level.
Similarly, problems at the continental level were viewed as more serious than at the country, town
or individual level, and problems at the country level were viewed as more serious than at the
town or individual level. Thus, environmental problems are perceived as being more serious at the
global rather than the local level (Figure 1). It was found that perceived individual responsibility
for the environment is greatest at the local level and decreases as the areal level becomes more
remote. There was a similar hierarchical structure to respondents’ attributions of responsibility for
tackling environmental problems, although in this case the relationship was reversed. Respondents
considered themselves to be least responsible for solving global environmental problems, with
slightly more responsibility being ascribed to the local community and environmental groups and
more responsibility still to national governments and international agencies. There was a
consensus amongst all three national groups concerning the relationship between level of
responsibility and spatial scale. Ironically, then, although people feel that they are responsible for
the environment at the local level this is precisely the level at which they perceive minimal
problems. The areal level which they perceive has the most serious environmental problems is the
areal level about which they feel least personally responsible and powerless to influence or act.
Although the public may express concern about the environment, responsibility for environmental
destruction, degradation and remediation is seen in many cases as lying outside the control of the
individual or even the community. It is at this point that we see a major shortcoming in an
information-deficit approach to tackling public understanding and action in respect of climate
change mitigation and adaptation: statutory and voluntary organisations are trying to raise the
public’s level of environmental concern and change their behaviours at precisely the level which
the public see as unproblematic.
Most recently Gifford, Scannell et al (2009) have undertaken an 18 nation study investigating
spatial optimism in respect of the current and expected future state of the environment. This has
confirmed both the spatial optimism identified by Uzzell (2000), and Dunlap’s (1993) findings
that respondents from the Global North and South evaluated environments differently. Various
psychological theories can be put forward to explain these findings: psycho-physiological
(Pawlik, 1991), behaviourist and individualistic (Pawlik, 1991, Bandura, 1977), experiential
(Fazio and Zanna, 1981), cognitive (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984, Weinstein, 1980, 1988), risk
(Slovic, 1987) and social representations (Moscovici, 1984) perspectives.  A detailed discussion
of these explanatory frameworks can be found in Uzzell (2000) but what they have in common is
that the kind of theoretical explanation offered by psychology, perhaps with the exception of
social representations, is often ahistorical and decontextualised.  As Bonaiuto, Breakwell and
Cano (1996) point out, although environmental issues are increasingly seen as international in
terms of extent, impact and necessary response, social psychological studies have traditionally
treated them as locally centred and limited to a single country. Not only is the local/global
environmental dimension played down, but the social and political relations which are the glue
that hold together our understanding and actions on the world are also minimised. This is
significant because it not only impacts upon the public’s feelings and attributions of responsibility
for personal action but may also affect political action and serve to provide a significant barrier to
changing carbon-generating and environmentally degrading social practices.
In 2007/8 we undertook a pilot study to explore whether the same spatial biasing identified in the
1990s is still detectable and whether the temporal pessimism (that is, people believe
environmental problems will worsen in the future) identified by Gifford Scannell et al (2009)
occurs.  Furthermore, we wanted to set the research within a different theoretical framework.
While the theories identified above all have some explanatory power in accounting for differential
perceptions and attributions of responsibility, it is our view that the individualistic orientation of
many of these theories fails to acknowledge the social, political and historical context in which
such perceptions and attributions are formed. The consequences of an approach that acknowledges
the contexts of everyday practices for policy-making would be to move attention away from
information-deficit and attitude-behaviour change models to recognising that individuals are the
sum of their social relations, i.e., they are the cause and consequence of their relations to others
and the environment (cf. Uzzell and Räthzel 2009).
2. Environmental Futures in Sweden and the UK
In the first section of the questionnaire we asked students in the UK and Sweden, through open-
ended questions, to identify their greatest concerns regarding the environment and what they
thought were the causes and solutions of these problems. The second part of the questionnaire
required respondents to indicate in how good or poor a state various aspects of the environment
were at the local, country and global levels on five point scales: the availability of fresh drinking
water; the state of natural environments (forests, wilderness, rivers and lakes etc); the degree of
biodiversity; the effects of greenhouse gases (e.g., carbon emissions, air pollution etc); the
management of waste; the effect of pesticides and herbicides; the management of noise pollution;
the management of radiation and nuclear waste. Furthermore, respondents were asked whether
they thought the environment would be in a better or poorer state in 20 years time. The
questionnaire was posted on a university webpage and students accessed and answered it
voluntarily and anonymously. This was a pilot study with a limited sample of 94 UK students
from the University of Surrey and 39 Swedish students from the University of Umeå. However,
we think the results are worth presenting because they illuminate some interesting issues that can
provide a point of departure for broader research and theoretical exploration. We will concentrate
on two themes from those that surfaced from the open-ended questions: the respondents’
perception of the relationship between the local and the global on the one hand, and societal
structures and the individual on the other. We will argue that the perceptions of these two
relationships are related to each other. Furthermore, while we do not want to enter into a detailed
discussion of the methods, it is theoretically and politically important to note the different answers
elicited by open ended questions and scaled response questions.
2.1. Dislocation or where is the global?
As a first step we were interested to know, whether our respondents would perceive
environmental problems as spatially distant as in the study conducted ten years ago (Uzzell 2000)
and more recently by Gifford, Scannell et al, (2009). If we aggregate the scores across eight
environmental indicators, we have two specific findings (Figure 2).
***** Figure 2 Here *****
Students in both countries consider the environment to be in a significantly poorer condition at the
country (t= -8.98, P<.001) and the global levels (t= -24.454, p<.001) than at the local level. The
local environment is evaluated as being on the positive side of average, whereas the global
environment is evaluated on the negative side. In other words, environmental problems are seen as
more serious the farther away they are from where the respondents live. Students in both countries
think that environmental problems will be significantly worse in 20 years time at the local (t=
-10.401, p<.001) and country (t= -8.144, p< .001) levels, but interestingly they do not predict
them to be any worse at the global level. While there is still a significant difference between the
respondent’s views of environmental degradation on local and global levels in 20 years time
(t=11.707, p<.001), it is much reduced.
Thus the results of this research confirm those of the studies discussed above. We have no reason
to believe that the psychological interpretations placed on these findings and discussed earlier are
any less relevant than they were a decade ago. Although there has been an increase in public
awareness of climate change, some explanations may have less currency now given that when
people have more actual or vicarious experience of climate change effects they may perceive the
local as more important than the global (Pawlik, 1991; Bandura, 1977). There are, however,
additional interpretations of these results which open up complementary explanations of this
dislocation.  For instance, these findings suggest that respondents are not aware that there is a link
between what they regard as global environmental problems and local practices and lifestyles.
This raises the question, where precisely is “the global”? Is it Greenland, where glaciers are
melting fast? Or Asia and Africa, where floods, storms, and droughts are increasing? Is it the other
side of the world? Or is it just somewhere else? Or is it everywhere because we are all globalised
now? But then it would make no sense to differentiate between a relatively safe local and a
threatening global environment.  The global is relational, like space in general (Massey, 2005). It
can only be defined from a specific position, and from any specific position the global is
elsewhere. One might argue then that there is no such thing as a global level. Every place is local,
and the global is only a specific effect of a milliard of actions in specific local places. Some
political and scholarly discourses take an opposite view as Massey discusses: they see
globalisation and global forces as producing and oppressing the local. In this view, the local may
be constructed as a victim or a last defence against globalising forces. Massey challenges such a
one-sided view emphasising that one has to introduce the notion of power relations in order to
understand  the relationship between global and local forces: local places like London, or the
USA, or the UK, she argues, “are the places in and through which globalisation is produced: the
moments through which the global is constituted, invented, coordinated.” (Massey, 2005: 101).
While we found the same result as in earlier studies that suggested that people see environmental
degradation as more serious at the global than at the local level (Klempton, 1991, Uzzell, 2000,
Lindström, 2003), in the light of the findings from the different parts of our questionnaire, we are
inclined to interpret these results differently. While respondents do rate environmental problems
more seriously at the ‘global’ level, what is more salient is the fact that they did not make any
kind of link between ’the local‘ and the ’global‘ given their view of diverging environmental
developments at each of these levels. The question then arises: where is ’the global‘ in the view of
our respondents? In the following we discuss responses to other parts of the survey that may
provide us with an answer to this question.
We asked the two groups to rate on a five-point scale the degree of importance of various causes
of environmental degradation: the production of goods and the way they are produced; over-
consumption of goods; weak political action on part of the government; the industrialisation of
developing countries; overpopulation; poverty in developing countries; the environmental policies
of industries; deregulation of industry by government; economic growth policies promoted by
governments; insufficient technological solution. For both Swedish and UK students ‘Weak
political action on part of the government’ was the most important cause of environmental
degradation (Figure 3). This mirrors the finding of a large–scale representative sample survey
undertaken by the UK Government and published in November 2007 which asked over 3000
people what they saw as the motivations and barriers to behaviour change to taking action on
climate change.  Sixty percent - the second highest response – said that “If government did more
to tackle climate change, I’d do more too” (Defra, 2007:  40). This indicates that the respondents
place a high priority on government action and do not see themselves as being able to influence or
put pressure on governments, but instead see themselves as reacting to government actions.
***** Figure 3 Here *****
Taking the highest mean score of respondents’ assessment of the important causes of
environmental degradation, governments are seen as the main culprits.  However, if we look at the
proportion of students who rated specific causes as extremely or very important, we find that
students identify poverty in developing countries, the industrialisation of developing countries,
and overpopulation as being the most significant causes of environmental degradation (Figure 4).
In a reversal of the global power relations analysed by Massey, our respondents saw the South as
producing what they see as global environmental degradation.
***** Figure 4 *****
We think that the way in which the South is constructed as the main cause of environmental
degradation in the answers of our respondents is not a coincidence. It has to be seen in the context
of constructions of the ‘Other’ through which the West defines itself. The complex and
multidimensional ways in which this happens has been analysed by many scholars, one of the first
and most prominent being Edward Said (1978). He demonstrated that the East can be the object of
desire when it stands for the exotic, the adventures and the emotions that are forbidden within
Western cultures. But it is also made to represent the uncivilised, the threatening Other, in relation
to which the West can define itself as superior and against which it needs to defend itself (Hall,
1997). Given the long history of Western concepts of a threatening (Eastern or Southern) Other
the references to developing countries as the causes of environmental degradation can be
understood as feeding off that history.
In ‘Risk and the Other’ Joffe discusses this mechanism of projecting internal conflicts on a
threatening Other for group relationships. She argues that in periods of crisis the out-group moves
from being a vague threat and  challenge to society’s way of life, to being seen as the ‘purveyor of
chaos’ (Joffe, 1999, 23), thus creating a righteous ‘us’ and a disruptive and transgressive ‘them’
(Douglas, 1966). Returning to environmental issues, media reports over the last decade of ‘tiger
economies’, ‘China building two power stations every week’ and ‘the rise of the Indian middle
classes demanding middle class consumer lifestyles’ only seem to confirm that ‘they’ are
responsible for bringing the [natural] system ‘out of control’ and into a state of chaos - sine qua
non for ‘otherness’. As Joffe argues, “The fundamental dynamic, when faced with a crisis, is to
form representations which protect the positive identity of the in-group” (Joffe, 1999: 33).
Blaming developing countries, the ‘Other’, for climate change through their ‘rampant’ and
‘irresponsible’ growth is one way of securing a positive collective self identity, a moral
superiority and an absolution from responsibility. One suspects that such representations can have
racialised overtones as well. The denigration and fear of ‘the Other’ is also invoked in scenarios of
the consequential impact of climate change, such as increased migration from the South to the
North, which is then automatically associated with conflict. In other words, there are various ways
in which the threat of climate change can merge with images of a threatening  ‘Other’, thus
creating a dangerous mixture of environmental concern and racist constructions. This has not
received much attention in the literature concerned with environmental degradation and climate
change. Including this perspective into the debate would add another dimension to what has been
termed “environmental racism”[3] (Bullard, 1993).  A merging of environmental concern and
racism is not only dangerous in itself, but also serves to undermine the necessary link between
environmental concern and global social justice.
What the answers of our respondents do not take into consideration is that industrial development
and consequential environmental degradation in the South and its wider impact on carbon
emissions and climate change for the whole world are also literally fuelling consumerism in the
North. Much of our consumer goods, including among other things designer and sport clothes and
electrical goods, are produced in China for Western consumption. At least 20% of industrial
investments in China come from Western corporations and smaller companies. Even many of the
investments from Hong Kong and Taiwan are estimated to come from the West using those
countries as tax havens. The Chinese and Western economies are also interdependent in terms of
trade and finance (Das Argument 2006, Arrighi, 2005). For instance, in 2006 China was the
number one trading partner of the EU in terms of imports. The EU imported products worth 192
Million Euros, while it exported goods to the value of a third of this, 62 million Euros (Eurostat,
2007: 59).
Even one of the major attempts to decrease carbon emissions in the North, namely the
replacement of fossil fuel with biofuel, is at the expense of countries in the South. The US usage
of corn for the production of ethanol created rising prices of corn in Mexico leading to the so
called Tortilla crisis. The cutting down of trees in large areas of South-East Asian forests to
cultivate palm trees for biodiesel sets far more carbon emissions free caused by the drying out of
the wetlands than can be saved by using it to replace fossil fuels (Henseling, 2009: 830).
While the dislocation of environmental degradation and the assignment of its causes to developing
countries featured prominently when our respondents were prompted to choose from pre-
formulated answers, the picture was very different when they expressed their views in their own
words in our open ended questions. Of the 549 responses given by the Swedish students in respect
of their concerns, perceived causes of and solutions to environmental degradation, in only nine
instances (1.6%) was there a relation to the image of the Other, i.e.,  overpopulation, the North-
South divide, China, and poverty in the South were mentioned. In the UK case, of the 1196
responses given by the UK students the figure was similar (18 responses; 1.5%). This indicates
that the construction of a threatening ‘Other’ may not be dominant in people’s thinking about the
causes of environmental degradation. Reports about the dangers of Chinese industrialisation for
climate change are comparatively recent, whereas discussion about CO2 emissions by
industrialised countries, the disappearance of nature as a result of urbanization, and the limits of
fossil resources have been discussed much longer and are therefore much more present in people’s
minds. With the reporting of high smog levels during the Olympic Games in Beijing such fears
might become more prominent. Maybe our contradictory results indicate the beginning of a
transformation of public discourse from emphasising the carbon emissions of industrialised
countries to emphasising the dangers coming from industrialising countries. Another explanation
could lie in the relationship between experiences and environmental concerns that became visible
when our respondents formulated their own answers to our open ended questions about their fears
regarding environmental degradation.
2.2. Local issues or the power of experience
Our questionnaire began with three open ended questions: “The issues that concern me most about
the environment are .....”, “What do you think are the main causes for the problems you observe?”
and “How do you think these problems should be solved?” In answering these questions students
identified issues that we had not foreseen when formulating the questionnaire. It should be noted
that the students in Sweden were almost all psychologists (80%), compared with the UK sample
where 60% were studying psychology, 17% sociology, 4% joint psychology and sociology and
12% economics. Other disciplines represented (UK and Sweden, less than 2% each) were
engineering, media and communications, pedagogy, and politics.
While both the Swedish and the UK students mentioned global warming as their main concern,
the next most salient issues were very different in each country (Figure 5). The UK students were
largely concerned with waste and the destruction of nature, a concern as important to them as
global warming. They mentioned the cutting down of trees, the disappearance of the rainforest
and of species, and urbanization destroying green areas. Waste was exemplified by the surfeit of
plastic bags and packaging. Pollution was mentioned almost as often as global warming. Pollution
can be seen as related to the concern with waste, if we see waste as being “matter out of place”
(Douglas, 1966).  While one could argue that these two issues are identical because some forms of
pollution cause climate change, we think it is important to look at the precise way in which people
formulate their concerns, since this will influence their perceptions of the causes and solutions and
ultimately the ways in which they act or refrain from acting.
**** Figure 5 Here *****
In the Swedish sample the students placed a greater emphasis on global warming, followed at
some distance by “pollution” and the “destruction of nature” without urbanization being
mentioned as a cause. Waste, which was so prominent in the UK sample, was hardly mentioned at
all. One explanation could be that when answering spontaneously respondents tend to connect
environmental degradation with their experiences. This explanation corresponds to findings of
earlier studies showing that lay people are no less aware of environmental problems than ‘experts’
but that they describe them differently, according to their experiences (Bonnes, Uzzell et
al, 2007). Similar findings have been made by Burningham and Thrush (2001) and Agyeman et
al. (2007) who show that contrary to popular belief, poor people also place a high value on
environmental sustainability but they talk more specifically about pollution and issues concerning
their local neighbourhood, but less about ‘climate change’. Thus, when people answer in general
surveys that they do not know very much about climate change, it does not necessarily mean that
they are not aware of environmental degradation or climate change, but rather that they think they
are not informed in the way of expert explanations for these phenomena or lack the confidence to
express them because they are ‘scientific’.
Although there may be a difference between scientific and lay descriptions of environmental
degradation, Demeritt (1998) has argued that scientific explanations have their own shortcomings:
they reduce issues of the environment degradation to their technical aspects, ignoring the social
relations that lead to their development. Even the scientific models themselves are not precise due
to the complexity of the issues, the limits of the technologies, the theoretical models to understand
them and the understandable tendency of scientists to be (over-)cautious when it comes to
predicting the future (Stern, 2009). This does not mean, as Demeritt points out, that scientific
explanations have to be seen as wrong (i.e. “merely constructed”), but rather they have to be
scrutinized with a critical eye. Instead of explaining lay descriptions of environmental degradation
in terms of information deficit, they need to be taken seriously and accounted for in policy
measures, since they reflect the way in which people are directly affected by the destruction of the
environment.
Summarising our results so far, we can say that the way in which the global and the local were
presented by our respondents was characterised by a dualism: climate change (or global warming
as they called it) as being especially serious, but produced and happening elsewhere, and local
environmental degradation described on the basis of everyday experiences. The same dualism
characterises the distinction between scientific and lay knowledge and public discourses and
policies, where social issues are dealt with in one domain, energy issues in another and economic
issues in yet another (Brand, 2008). It is only when one (assumed) solution is analysed in terms of
all its consequences (i.e., the replacement of fossil fuels with biofuels) that the dense net of social,
economic and spatial power relations becomes apparent in the form of the devastating
environmental and economic effects, i.e., a measure in one country impacts seriously and
detrimentally on a less powerful country. Concepts like political ecology (Bryant, 2001),
liberation ecology (Peet and Watts, 1996), social nature (Braun and Castree, 2001), the production
of nature (Smith, 1984), and environmental justice (Taylor, 2000) advocate transcending the
dualism between nature and the social as well as the separation of the local and the global.
However, it seems that in the everyday perceptions of environmental degradation this dualistic
thinking is still firmly in place.
We will try to understand these perceptions by discussing the role which our respondents assign to
individuals and societal structures when they describe the causes of and solutions to
environmental degradation. Thereafter, we will conclude with a discussion of the way in which
we think the local/global perceptions and the perceptions of individuals and societal structures
relate to each other.
3. The relationship between Individuals and Societal Structures
3.1 Causes of environmental degradation: individuals versus societal institutions
While students in both countries see the behaviour of individuals as the major cause of
environmental degradation they do differ in terms of the importance they attribute to this factor in
relation to others (Figure 6). Almost half of the British students (45%) see individual behaviour as
the main cause of environmental degradation with policies of government and industry lagging far
behind (12 and 10% respectively).
***** Figure 6 Here *****
In Sweden, slightly more than one third (37%) of the students think that individual behaviour is
the cause of environmental degradation, while almost one fifth (19%) think that the way in which
society is organised is the main problem: they mention the lack of public transport, cultural forces
such as consumption and a Western lifestyle and capitalism. Industry and politics occupy the next
position with 13% of the responses each. In other words, Swedish students place a relatively
greater emphasis on structural factors, on societal institutions as compared to individual behaviour
to explain the endangered state of the environment.
A similar result emerges when we use a subset of items to produce an ‘Attitude to Economic
Growth’ scale (?=.663), comprising those items which focussed on the policies of government and
industry (i.e., the production of goods and the way they are produced, weak political action on
part of the government, deregulation of industry and economic growth policies promoted by
governments. When respondents score highly, they think that economic growth and insufficient
governmental constraints on industry are the most important causes of environmental degradation.
The Swedish respondents were much more likely to say that environmental degradation comes
about through economic growth policies (t= -2.612, p<.01), i.e., they regarded industry and
government as a critical factor in causing environmental degradation.
3.2 Solutions: Authoritarianism vs. Self-transformation
What is similar in both countries is that although individuals are seen as the cause of
environmental problems, they are not seen as the solution (Figure 7). Both British and Swedish
students invest their hope in their respective governments even though they regard their lack of
action as one of the principal causes of environmental degradation. Again, there is a difference in
degree as well as in kind. Consistent with their perception of the causes of environmental
despoliation, the students in Umeå mentioned more often than the British students that societal
change is needed: Northern lifestyles, consumption, values and, listed most often, capitalism need
to be addressed. They place less reliance on government action than British students and express
some faith in people changing themselves as opposed to being forced to change through ‘stick and
carrot’ levers such as financial incentives, laws and penalties. Regarding the measures
government should take in relation to individuals, the Swedish students saw information as
necessary as the implementation of laws. In other words, the approach of the Swedish students to
behaviour change in individuals is less authoritarian than in the British case; they regard
individuals more as the subjects rather than the objects of change. British students not only place
individuals at the top of their list of causes, they are also quite impatient with what they see as
people’s unwillingness to protect the environment. Words like laziness, ignorance and
unwillingness are used relatively often. There is seldom an acknowledgement that it might be
impossible for people to act in an environmentally friendly way because they cannot, for example,
afford green consumption options or give up their cars. Our respondents’ view of individualism,
defining people as having the freedom of choice, does not account for the societal conditions and
constraints under which people act.
***** Figure 7 Here *****
One way of understanding these differences is to interpret them as a result of the different
organisation of and self-understanding within the two societies. With a long tradition of Social
Democratic governments in Sweden (1936-1976 and then again 1982–2006 with a short interval
of a centre right government between 1991-1994), society, more precisely the state, is seen as
having the responsibility to provide adequate living conditions and working conditions, and to
support those members of society who are not able to provide for themselves. The welfare state as
a mechanism to create a society in which equality and justice are provided for all its members still
has high credibility in Sweden. On the other hand, individuals are expected to act in a way that
contributes to society’s wellbeing and this can explain why individual behaviour is also seen as
the most important cause of environmental degradation.
In the UK individualism, understood as an independence of individuals from their societal
context, has been at the centre of societal transformation in recent British history. While criticised
at the time and ever since, it would seem that Margaret Thatcher’s claim that "there’s no such
thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families”, has had an impact
on the British psyche. Thatcher’s statement was not just a political discourse trying to organise
consensus around the notion of the independent individual and the family, it was accompanied by
structural transformations which led to the weakening of collective organisations, most notably
the trades unions, and the privatisation of public institutions and welfare provision (Young, 1986,
Fairbrother et al., 2006). The students taking part in the survey belong predominantly to a post-
Thatcher generation that grew up when these transformations were already in place and taken for
granted. As Bauman writes, “Thatcher’s fanciful imagination (became) a fairly precise description
of the real world, as seen from the inside of its inhabitants’ experience.” (Bauman, 2007: 50,
emphasis in the original). It is this internalisation of the individualistic view, or better, the mutual
reinforcement of societal transformations and the way in which individuals experience the world
that creates what at first sight seems like a contradiction in terms: on the one hand, the blaming of
individuals implying that they are autonomous entities, capable of exercising choice and thus fully
responsible for their actions, and on the other a reliance on the state and its use of top-down
instruments of incentives, laws, and penalties.
It is not surprising that our respondents saw individuals as the main causes of environmental
degradation, since it is also the individual who is seen to be responsible by governments and
implicitly by researchers for excessive resource use and consumption, waste and carbon emissions
by pursuing  ignorant, errant, and self-serving consuming behaviours and practices. The
assumption underlying questions asked in government surveys, and often tacitly or explicitly
taken on board by researchers when they are asked to advise on strategies for behaviour
change[4], is that society is a mere array of private individuals, deprived of social relations (the
term private derives from the Latin “privare” meaning to deprive of).
Such a concept reflects the world in which we live: individualisation is characteristic of capitalist
market societies in general and is exacerbated under neoliberal conditions, where organisations
which can counter individualisation (e.g., trade unions and other social movements) have been
weakened through deregulation in the “New Economy” (Boltanski and Chiappello, 2005). Many
researchers have analysed and criticised the weakening of social bonds especially the so-called
precarisation of work creating a fundamental insecurity and exacerbated by the need to secure
one’s chance of survival in a cut-throat competitive world that is not mitigated through
organisations of solidarity  (Sennett, 1998, 2006, Kasser et al., 2007, Castel, 2003). As Deranty
argues presenting the work of Dejours: “The welfare state compromise that was organized around
large collectives (...), by anchoring the individual in strong ‘supportive networks’ not only
ensured that all (employed) individuals would find an institutional defence of their economic and
social interests, but also provided a social and cultural frame for their existence.” (Deranty, 2008:
460). It is this frame that is being weakened.
Ironically, at the same time as people are addressed as autonomous individuals, who need to
fend for themselves instead of expecting help from the “nanny state”, they are also addressed as
responsible citizens who need to take care of the environment and nature as it is regarded as a
social good, even as a good requiring stewardship for future generations. This leads us back to one
aspect of the introductory discussion. Researchers have found that people feel predominantly
responsible for their local environment (Uzzell, 2000, Lindström, 2003) and less so for
environmental degradation in other areas of the world. In Lindström’s view this is due to a feeling
of powerlessness and she suggests that one way of overcoming this and of empowering people
would be to introduce what she calls community management (Lindström, 2003: part II,19f).
What she does not discuss, however, is that the sense of powerlessness might be a reflection of a
larger issue, namely the reality of individualisation and competitiveness that governs society at
large. They may not only undermine social cohesion in the work arena but also in the urban
context (Putnam, 2000, Forest and Kearns, 2001).
It is in this context that the views of the British students, namely to think that environmental
degradation is predominantly the responsibility of individuals while seeing the solution lying in
authoritarian government action (i.e., by supporting policy instruments of incentives, laws, and
penalties), become understandable. When the individualisation process positions people as
competitors against each other and weakens the possibilities for solidarity, then we can speak
about a Hobbesian society in which individuals become deadly enemies to each other. In such a
context, socially responsible behaviour has to be imposed from above by a strong state as Hobbes
suggested.
The students in our sample not only saw other people as egoistic individuals, who have to be
forced into socially responsible behaviour, but they also experienced themselves in this way.
Hardly any of the Swedish or British samples imagined themselves as being able to play an active
role in changing the conditions that lead to environmental degradation. Only two students in
Sweden and two in the UK mentioned political pressure from below as a possibility to force
governments to act in favour of the environment. Nevertheless, these four students are examples
of another kind of responsibility towards the environment. Apart from acknowledging the
importance of recycling waste and saving energy, they recognised the importance of acting
politically as citizens, saying that: “Democracy is people power, we need to take responsibility
and begin to put pressure on our elected representatives to adopt more environmentally oriented
goals”, that there is a need for “firmer control of the elected so the voters can ensure that the
elected work for a society that is sustainable”, and claiming it is necessary to put “pressure on
governments to change things, when new buildings are built, have them built with solar panels for
example”  or that one should “boycott McDonalds and other products.”
4. Some Concluding Considerations
In conclusion we would like to discuss how the failure of seeing a connection between local
actions and global effects is related to a reductionist individualism that regards pressure from the
state as the only possibility to make individuals act in a socially responsible way. If individuals
cannot experience themselves as part of society, because society is organised in such a manner
that forces them into competitive and egoistic behaviours, they are equally unlikely to experience
their local and personal actions or the activities of their local government as part and parcel of
wider events, as impacting on other areas of the world. The same dualistic thinking that constructs
a dichotomy between individuals and society is also at work in constructing a dichotomy between
the local and the global, resulting in a psycho-social dislocation.
The social character of individual acts becomes especially tangible in times of a crisis. The
financial crisis was the result of individual acts. Yet, without state intervention, the results of these
individual acts threaten to destroy the very basis of the economic system. Equally, the global
nature of local actions only becomes visible in retrospect, when they revisit the local in the form
of destruction. They are therefore experienced as forces from outside, from a threatening ‘Other’.
At a political level there is an additional connection between reductionist individualism and the
construction of environmental degradation as a consequence of the actions of undeveloped
countries ‘out there’. In a society of atomised individuals with conflicting interests it is difficult to
create social consensus. Images of a threatening ‘Other’ have always been evoked to create such a
consensus. There is a danger that this language will emerge and dominate climate change
discourses.
There is a large body of theories which aims to transcend the dualism between the individual and
society, nature and society, and the local and the global in the context of understanding
environmental degradation. Marxist, feminist and socialist feminist approaches to ecology have
theorised the relationship between nature and the social (e.g. Braun and Castree, 2001, Foster,
2000,  Mellor, 1998) and analysed the way in which capitalism is not only exploitative of workers
but of nature as well (Smith, 1984). However, while they have challenged the dualism of the
social and the natural, they have not analysed the ways in which individuals experience as well as
reproduce this and other dualisms in their daily perceptions and practices.
Psychology provides us with a variety of models and approaches to understand individual
behaviour and its environmental impacts. The problem has been, as discussed in the introduction,
that those psychologists working on environmental issues have often disregarded the social
context within which these behaviours develop. And even where these have been taken into
account, they have not been critically analysed and understood as products of history.  To treat
presently observable patterns of behaviour as indicators of how people ‘are’ ignores the ways in
which such behaviours and relations came into being and prevents us from developing solutions
that can transform existing behaviours by transforming social relations.
A third set of literature, mostly by political scientists, have explored the possibilities of a ’Green
State‘ (Eckersley, 2004) and the opportunities for a deliberative democracy (Dryzek, 2000). These
approaches have also criticised the notion of an autonomous individual that forms the basis of the
present model of liberal democracy (Eckersley, 2004). They strive to include different social
groups in a new post-liberal model of a green democracy.. In discussing democracy exclusively
within the domain of the public sphere and political institutions they have not included the
privatised sphere of production as a decisive arena into which democracy needs to be introduced.
As we have argued, the dualistic perceptions of the local and the global, the individual and the
state that emerged in our study, have to be understood in the context of their respective societies
and the ways in which they organise these relationships through their institutions and discourses.
This implies that political processes cannot be disconnected or organised separately from the ways
in which people work, consume, and generally relate to each other in what is usually defined as
the public/political sphere. We have discussed this more in detail elsewhere (Uzzell and Räthzel,
2009).
Another implication of our results is that social sciences must investigate more closely processes
in which individuals aim to solve environmental problems collectively. The literature on
deliberative democracy is an important source for such an analysis as well as the research on
environmental social movements (Peet and Watts, 1996). Individualisation and its complement, an
excessive belief in state regulation, can only get us so far in solving the environmental problems
we face. Since such policies do not acknowledge individuals as socially responsible actors, they
are likely to produce cultures of resistance or the passivity they try overcome. Societal projects
like transition towns may provide an example of how reductionist individualisation can be
overcome (Hopkins, 2008), but these too will have to resolve political issues of sectional interests
and conflict as well as envisioning radical and insightful alternative futures if “bland compromises
based on conventional wisdom” are not to consign this promising initiative to the way of previous
utopian communities (cf. Greer, 2008). Another example is trade union organisations engaged in
activities for green jobs, just transition and the reduction of carbon emissions (Touchstone, 2009).
These are examples of individuals becoming responsible citizens through collective action.
Whether these movements are also able to transcend the local context within which they are
embedded, take the issues of environmental justice and the North-South divide into consideration
and proceed to a responsibility for global developments remains to be seen.
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[1] Published in Räthzel, N. and Uzzell, D. (2009) ‘Changing Relations in Global Environmental Change’,
Global Environmental Change, 19, 326 – 335.
[2] Although climate change is certainly the issue most prominently discussed in public and scientific
debates, in our study we asked people about their environmental concerns and therefore people often talked
about issues not directly connected to climate change. The term environmental degradation includes
problems that do not contribute to or are not the effect of climate change and in that sense it is broader.
Where we want to include these issues we use both terms.
[3] Environmental racism typically refers to the placing of environmentally hazardous waste and
production sites in areas with predominantly black or ethnic minority inhabitants within the North or in
countries of the South.
[4] For a critique of policy oriented research see also Demeritt 2001
